





Peter Merian-Weg 6 
4052 Basel, Switzerland 
wwz.unibas.ch 
Corresponding Author: 
Prof. Dr. Alois Stutzer 
Tel: +41 (0) 61 207 33 61 
Mail: alois.stutzer@unibas.ch 

















Overstrained Citizens?  
The Number of Ballot Propositions and the Quality of  










WWZ Working Paper 2018/25                  Alois Stutzer, Michael Baltensperger, Armando N. Meier 
 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  














The Number of Ballot Propositions and the Quality of the Decision Process in
Direct Democracy
Alois Stutzer? Michael Baltensperger† Armando N. Meier‡
October 4, 2018
Abstract
We study how the number of ballot propositions affects the quality of
decision making in direct democracy, as reflected in citizens’ knowledge, vot-
ing behavior, and attitudes toward democracy. Using three comprehensive
data sets from Switzerland with over 3,500 propositions, we exploit variation
in the number of federal propositions and plausibly exogenous variation in
the number of cantonal propositions. Only with a relatively high number of
propositions on the ballot do voters have less knowledge about federal proposi-
tions. Otherwise, we find no indication that the number of ballot propositions
impedes the quality of decision making in direct democracy. For instance, a
higher number of propositions does not lead more voters to support proposals
endorsed by pole parties. If anything, having more federal propositions on
the ballot relates to higher perceived political influence and satisfaction with
democracy.
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1 Introduction
Direct democracy is a most important process for collective decision making.1 Like
any democratic process it has informational demands and relies on public discourse.2
A meaningful discourse is helping citizens form a reasoned opinion.3 However, con-
cerns have been raised about uninformed and overburdened voters, overstrained by
the number of issues about which they are asked to decide (for discussions, see, e.g.,
Bowler, 2015; Lupia, 2016; Seabrook, Dyck and Lascher, 2015). Overburdened voters
may be easily swayed and are more likely to follow the endorsements of extremists.
This reasoning suggests a relationship between the quality of the decision process
and the number of propositions on the ballot. On the one hand, citizens might be
too infrequently engaged with the political process so that neither the politicians nor
the media nor citizens’ networks are prepared for an open and productive discourse.
On the other hand, there might be too many issues being debated, which can turn
a potentially meaningful discourse into a superficial exchange of slogans. If citizens
feel overstrained, the motivation to cast an informed vote might decline, and support
for the very process of direct democracy might be undermined.4
In this paper, we explore how the number of propositions on the ballot affects the
quality of the decision-making process in direct democracy. Following Matsusaka’s
(1995) information theory of voting, we assume that voters are at least partly intrin-
sically motivated to vote whereby the incentive to vote increases with the confidence
in their vote choice. Information increases certainty about the consequences of a
proposition. With each additional proposition, voters looking for orientation thus
have to gauge whether they should acquire more costly information or search for
1There is a rich scientific literature in political science and political economics analyzing how
the possibility of direct democratic participation affects the political process by offering additional
means to control politicians and to discuss politics (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2006; Cronin,
1999; Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). The consequences of direct democracy have been empirically
studied, primarily for the United States and Switzerland (see, e.g., Asatryan et al., 2017; Bowler
and Donovan, 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Funk and Gathmann, 2011; Kirchga¨ssner, Feld and
Savioz, 1999; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016; Matsusaka, 2018).
2The fundamental role of public discussions about politics for the functioning of democracy is
emphasized in work on deliberative democracy (e.g., Habermas, 1992; Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 2000)
and on the pre- and postreferendum stage in direct democracy (e.g., Benz and Stutzer, 2004;
Bohnet and Frey, 1994).
3The concept of “considered opinion” in direct democracy is developed in Colombo (2018).
4In the United States, the rise in the number of citizen initiatives (?) has raised concerns that
direct democratic decision making is applied too often (Democracy in America, 2009; Baldassare,
2013; Broder, 2000; Luce, 2016; Schrag, 2004). In Switzerland, the debate focuses inter alia on
the threshold for the qualification of initiatives (e.g., Ru¨hli and Adler, 2015). The concern about
too many popular decisions may gain further attention with the spread of e-democracy or instant
democracy. A complementary debate thus concerns the constitutional requirements, for example,
with regard to signature requirements, that have to be met for a proposition to qualify for ballot
voting and how this affects the number of popular decisions.
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cues allowing them to use heuristics. On the basis of this theory, we derive indicators
that are meant to capture traces of overstrained citizens.
To empirically analyze the consequences of a high number of ballot propositions, we
exploit the unique setting of Swiss direct democracy. We rely on the variation in the
number of federal propositions on the ballot as well as plausibly exogenous variation
in concurrent cantonal propositions, that is, propositions from the subfederal state
level. For the empirical tests, we use three comprehensive data sets: administrative
data (1981–2015), individual postvote survey data (1981–2015), and household panel
data (1999–2012) with up to 290,000 observations.
Our results are threefold: First, we consider the relationship between the number
of propositions on the ballot and voters’ knowledge, turnout, blank voting, and use
of decision shortcuts. We find that only with a relatively high number of federal
and cantonal propositions on the ballot do voters tend to have less knowledge about
propositions and to cast more blank votes. Given the deliberate agenda setting of
the Federal Council for the federal propositions, the correlations might reflect con-
sequences of the number of propositions as well as of their specific content. Focusing
on the consequences of a high number of concurrent cantonal propositions, we mea-
sure a positive effect on turnout probably due to a mobilization effect, as more issues
are likely to affect more citizens to a larger extent. With more propositions on the
ballot, citizens are not more likely to vote in line with the recommendations of the
pole parties. We thus do not find any systematic evidence for polarization. We also
do not observe an increase in voting for the status quo.
Second, we assess how the number of proposals within the last 12 months relates
to voters’ knowledge and behavior and we do not find systematic relationships.
The coefficients for past cantonal proposition are close to zero and rather precisely
estimated.
Third, we estimate the relationship between the recent or forthcoming number of
propositions and citizens’ perceived influence, interest in politics, and general sup-
port of democracy. We find no evidence that a higher number of propositions nega-
tively affects citizens’ attitudes toward democracy. If anything, our results suggest
that citizens tend to feel more influential in politics and are more satisfied with
democracy when they are more intensely exposed to direct democracy at the federal
level. In sum, our rich set of results suggests that the currently occurring number
of propositions does not overstrain citizens.
This paper contributes novel evidence on how active involvement in democracy af-
fects citizens. Regarding the potential overburdening of citizens, recent evidence
highlights the pure choice fatigue effect of a high number of decisions on candidates
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or propositions on voting behavior. For instance, Augenblick and Nicholson (2016)
argue that voters get tired as they fill out long ballot forms. They exploit exogenous
variation in the number of positions on ballot forms across California precincts. In
their setting, voters are confronted with, on average, over 30 items and are found
to be more likely to vote for the status quo when they reach the propositions at the
bottom of the ballot form.
Our setting allows us to study a situation that is more representative of most mature
democracies: There are several vote weekends a year and voters decide on a limited
number of propositions on each of them. This is similar to the situation with multiple
elections on the same vote weekend. Although choice fatigue may still matter in such
a setting (Garmann, 2017), a pure choice fatigue effect due to choice overload seems
less likely. Rather, voters in our setting have to process political information for
each additional proposition on the ballot and we want to understand their reaction
to this. We thus consider the previous literature that focuses on how the number of
propositions and proposition complexity relate to voter behavior (see, in particular,
Bowler and Donovan 1998; Hessami 2016; Matsusaka 2016; Selb 2008; Stadelmann
and Torgler 2013).
We add to this literature by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the number
of propositions citizens face. With the exception of Augenblick and Nicholson (2016),
previous studies do not address potential confounding effects due to the content of
propositions. Moreover, we also study consequences for citizens’ attitudes toward
democracy in general rather than focusing on turnout or voting behavior alone.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual
framework. In Section 3, we explain the institutional setting and present the data.
In Section 4, we describe the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results. We
offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Conceptual Framework
The democratic process is about information exchange and preference formation
as much as it is about information or preference aggregation. The debate about
overburdened citizens revolves around a prominent concern: Citizens have to deal
with multiple issues within a limited period of time, which can overstrain voters’
capabilities and undermine the quality of the political discourse as well as of the
collective decisions. Here the focus is on the concern that too many propositions
may harm the quality of direct democratic decision making.
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We argue that there are two counteracting forces at play that lead to an inverse
U-shaped relationship between the quality of decision making and the number of
propositions (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The number of propositions and the quality of decision making














On the one hand, an active direct democracy fosters citizens’ capacity to acquire
and process political information (see, e.g, Barber 2004; Benz and Stutzer 2004;
Bohnet and Frey 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001;
Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Olken 2010; Smith and Tolbert 2007). Different mech-
anisms might be at work. Individual voters learn to inform themselves about politics
and they build up political capital.5 Thereby voters do not have to become politi-
cal “encylopedias” (Lupia, 1994) but can rely on their experiences and information
shortcuts (see Cramer and Toff 2017 for a review of the arguments). Moreover,
the media responds to the increased demand for issue-specific political information,
leading to lower information costs.6
On the other hand, given a certain level of political capital of citizens and of political
news coverage in the media, a high number of propositions may lead citizens to
5Two strands of related literature study (i) habit formation in voting, potentially picking up
some of the same mechanisms that are also relevant when people are frequently exposed to decisions
about propositions (see, e.g., Bechtel, Hangartner and Schmid 2018) and (ii) political socialization
(see, e.g., Slotwinski and Stutzer (2018) in the context of female suffrage).
6This line of argument has not found unanimous support in the literature. For instance,
Seabrook, Dyck and Lascher (2015) argue that there are few educative benefits of direct democracy,
as they do not find a correlation between the presence of direct democracy and general political
knowledge in U.S. states. Similarly, Schlozman and Yohai (2008) do not find large turnout or
knowledge spillovers from direct democratic votes to general elections. One might not be surprised
by the latter result, though, as elections become relatively less important in the presence of direct
democratic participation rights.
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be less informed about each single political issue. This is because citizens have
a limited capacity to process political information due to limited time, attention,
or interest. Hence, an increase in the number of propositions on the ballot also
increases the average uncertainty a citizen has about each proposition.7 Voters might
become susceptible to biased information or be more easily swayed by arguments
favoring narrow interests or extremists’ positions. Disappointed about the process
and potentially unfavorable outcomes, they doubt their influence on politics and
become dissatisfied with democracy altogether.8
In sum, a low level of citizen involvement in politics may be detrimental to voters’
capability to make well-grounded decisions because of low levels of political capital
and processing capacity for political information. A very active democracy may,
however, overstrain citizens through increasing costs for acquiring and processing
political information. To strengthen citizens’ sovereignty and simultaneously limit
the risk of uncertainty, institutional preconditions should lead to a balanced involve-
ment of citizens.
In this paper, we focus on the right-hand side of Figure 1 and look for traces of over-
strained citizens, studying citizens’ behavior and self-reports. Regarding behavior,
we derive predictions about the potential effects of a high number of propositions
following the model of Matsusaka (1995). In his voting model, voters have an intrin-
sic motivation to vote, but their incentive to cast a vote depends on the perceived
benefit of their vote. Uncertainty about the effects of propositions diminish the
perceived benefit. Therefore, the more certain voters are about the benefits of their
vote choice, the more likely they are to turn out. If more information increases the
certainty about the consequences of proposals, then more information is also likely
to increase turnout. On the basis of this theory, many stylized facts about turnout
have been rationalized.
A first look at our data, presented in Figure 2, supports the argument for this mech-
anism. On both the individual and the aggregate level, we see a strong correlation
between how well voters are informed and turnout. Citizens who knew a lot about
a ballot proposition voted with a likelihood of 70%. In contrast, citizens with little
knowledge about the proposition participated with a likelihood of only 30%.9
7The latter may be less of a problem for information aggregation as long as voters have an
informative signal about the attractiveness of a proposal and the law of large numbers comes into
play (known as the Condorcet jury theorem).
8The latter aspect might be described as a procedural disutility of an overly demanding mecha-
nism of political decision making (see Frey, Benz and Stutzer (2004) for the concept of procedural
utility and Stutzer and Frey (2006) for an application to direct democracy).
9This also highlights an important trade-off in normative evaluations of a high turnout per se
vis-a`-vis having informed voters. Hodler, Luechinger and Stutzer (2015) emphasize that turnout
in itself may not be the relevant indicator from a welfare perspective if more uninformed voters
cast a ballot.
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Average knowledge about proposition
Note: The graph on the left shows the average self-reported turnout of all respondents (including respondents
who did not vote), grouped by their knowledge about the proposition. Respondents who were “not informed”
were neither able to reproduce the title nor the content of a proposition. The respondents who were “somewhat
informed” were able to reproduce either the title or the content of the proposition. Respondents who were “very
informed” were able to reproduce the title and the content of a proposition. In the graph on the right, each dot
represents a proposition. The correlation between national turnout and average knowledge is 0.23. Information
on national turnout is based on administrative data. Information on average knowledge of the citizens about
a proposition is based on postvote survey data. The three propositions with the highest turnout (in the top
right corner of the graph on the right) are the referendum over the accession of Switzerland to the European
Economic Area (06.12.1992), the initiative on the abolition of the Swiss army, and the initiative on increasing
the maximum speed limit on motorways to 130 km/h (26.11.1989).
Data sources: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, VoxIt.
According to the model, voters have to acquire costly information about each ad-
ditional proposition on the ballot if they want to be certain about their choices. If
citizens were overburdened by too many propositions we should observe a decrease
in citizens’ knowledge about the propositions on the ballot as well as a reduction
in turnout. On the basis of the same calculus, we would also expect an increase in
blank votes.
Slightly extending the theoretical considerations, we expect that strained citizens
are more likely to use decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status quo.10 Voting
for the status quo has been used in several studies to assess the consequences of long
ballots. In previous work on Switzerland (Selb, 2008) as well as the United States
(e.g., Matsusaka 2016), a positive correlation has been found between ballot length
and voting for the status quo. Augenblick and Nicholson (2016) even identified a
causal effect of ballot length on choosing the status quo.11
10Besides cognitive load, Meier, Schmid and Stutzer (2016) highlight the role of emotions in the
use of decision shortcuts and find that individuals are more likely to vote for the status quo if they
are in a bad mood.
11In related research on the complexity of ballot propositions, Hessami (2016) and Hessami and
Resnjanskij (2018) provide evidence that propositions that cause a high cognitive burden are more
likely to be rejected so that the status quo is maintained.
6
Another decision shortcut voters might use is to follow endorsements from political
parties and organizations. Comparing support for the recommendation of the federal
government in a long time series for Switzerland, Stadelmann and Torgler (2013)
observe that when the agenda is set to involve only one proposition (rather than sev-
eral), voters are less likely to follow the government. While the finding might reflect
that controversial issues are put on the agenda alone, the observation is also consis-
tent with the use of cues in complex decisions. We concentrate on endorsements of
pole parties. If citizens are more likely to follow them if they are strained, a high
number of propositions on the ballot reinforces polarization. We would like to note
here already that an empirical test of this hypothesis is difficult as parties sponsor
propositions. In the Swiss context, pole parties are particularly active so that with
many propositions on the ballot, pole party propositions become more likely. We
will therefore concentrate on the effects of concurrent cantonal propositions.
We also examine citizens’ self-reports. We concentrate on their reported efficacy,
that is, their perceived ability to influence politics. If overstrained, citizens are
expected to report a lower interest in politics, a lower perceived personal influence
in politics, and overall less satisfaction with democracy. Previous research focuses
on empirical tests of a presumed positive relationship between direct democracy and
political efficacy. For Switzerland, recent work explores the relationship between the
extent and use of direct democratic rights and trust in cantonal authorities (Bauer
and Fatke, 2014; Kern, 2017). For the United States, a series of studies reports
positive effects on political efficacy (many of them reviewed in Smith and Tolbert
(2007)). The assessment was challenged by Dyck and Lascher (2008). Recent work
based on new data (Wolak, 2017) reports higher internal efficacy in ballot initiative
states.
3 Institutions and Data
Direct democracy is central to the Swiss political system. Citizens in Switzerland
face decisions about several propositions per year on different constitutional levels.
The outcomes of all of these propositions are binding and can lead to major changes
in public policy. Notable important propositions on the federal level include several
votes on the integrated market with the European Union, fundamental changes to
the federal tax code, and the future of the social security system. Such votes are
intensely covered in the media.
There are two broad categories of direct democratic votes: referendums and popular
initiatives. On the federal level, popular initiatives allow citizens, parties, and special
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interest groups to propose constitutional amendments. A vote on an amendment
takes place if the initiators collect 100,000 valid signatures within 18 months. A
mandatory referendum takes place for all amendments to the federal constitution
proposed by the federal Parliament. In addition, federal laws approved by both
chambers of Parliament are put to a popular vote if a committee submits 50,000
valid signatures within 100 days after the Parliament’s resolution.
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Data source: Database of Swiss Federal Referendums.
Throughout the year, voters decide, on average, about nine federal propositions
distributed over three polling days.12 Figure 3 shows that the variance in the number
of federal propositions across polling days is sizable, with the minimum number of
propositions on the ballot being one, the maximum nine. Figure A.2 in the Appendix
presents the number of federal propositions per year. In contrast to discussions about
a current flood of propositions, the number of federal propositions on the ballot has
not significantly increased in recent years. However, there has been an accumulation
of initiatives since the year 2000, as indicated by the red bars in Figure 3.
Initiatives as well as referendums are also frequently and consistently used at the
subfederal level of the 26 cantons that enjoy considerable sovereignty. The out-
12The federal Chancellery sets four polling days for every year in advance that can be used
depending on the number of pending propositions (see the list until 2037 on https://www.bk.
admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/vab_1_3_3_1.html#).
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comes of these votes are equally binding and can lead to large policy changes in the
respective canton. The propositions cover subjects such as cantonal taxes, infras-
tructure investments, and land-use planning and feature prominently in the local
media. Moreover, the national television media communicate many of the results
of the cantonal votes together with the results of the federal votes. The number
of propositions per federal polling day and canton has been quite stable over the
years with an average of 5.7 propositions per canton and year. Cantons are free to
schedule their votes but over time they have increasingly held them parallel to the
federal votes. The total number of cantonal propositions has been falling over time
(see Figure A.3 in the Appendix).
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Note: The highest numbers of cantonal propositions emerge in cantons with votes taking place on the same day
as federal votes.
Data source: c2d, Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau.
Citizens fill in federal and cantonal ballot cards at home and bring them to the
ballot box on the vote weekend or mail them before the vote weekend.13 The ballot
cards from the federal and cantonal chancelleries arrive in the same envelope and are
accompanied by a federal and a cantonal booklet. The short texts summarize the
arguments on each proposition and list a recommendation of the government. The
13Postal voting was gradually introduced across cantons from the 1970s through the 1990s. More
than 80% use it today (Luechinger, Rosinger and Stutzer, 2007).
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ballot cards state the type of vote and the title of each proposition. In a designated
field on the right, people can write out “Yes” or “No” by hand.
We use three main data sets for the analysis.14 The first data set is a record of
individual voting decisions from postvote surveys about federal ballots. Several
Swiss universities and the private research institute GFS administered these so-called
VOX surveys after each federal polling day (Kriesi, Brunner and Lore´tan, 2017). A
representative sample of roughly 1,000 voters is interviewed by phone within 2 weeks
after the polling day. The resulting VoxIt data contains information on whether and
how respondents voted, knowledge about the propositions, and perceived complexity
and perceived importance of the propositions as well as socioeconomic characteristics
of the respondents. The sample of VoxIt that we are using for our analysis contains
information of 293,641 respondents from 24 Swiss cantons15 who were interviewed
in the years 1981 to 2015. The observations were collected following 97 polling days
during which Swiss citizens voted on 285 federal propositions.16
Our second data set contains information on turnout as well as the fraction of yes and
no votes for federal propositions on the cantonal level. This is an administrative data
set that consists of 7,056 observations that capture the results of 294 propositions
in 24 cantons. This data set covers the same period as the VoxIt data and features
all 295 propositions that happened in that period on 102 polling days. The data
were obtained from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
The two data sets are extended with information about the vote recommendations
of parties and the Federal Council, as well as about the legal form of the proposi-
tion. The latter information is taken from Swissvotes, a database maintained by the
University of Bern and Anne´e Politique Suisse (2018).17 We supplement the VoxIt
and administrative data sets with the number of concurrent federal and cantonal
propositions as well as the number of propositions within the last year. This in-
14Table A.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables that are most frequently used in
our analyses.
15We exclude observations from the two cantons Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus. These two
cantons maintain an assembly democracy (“Landsgemeinde”), i.e., a direct democratic process
that is rather different from other cantons’ institutions. The canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden has
the smallest population and Glarus the fourth smallest population of all Swiss cantons. Excluding
those two cantons reduces the VoxIt data set by 2,034 observations. We exclude observations
from these two cantons in all individual-level analyses. Assembly democracy on the cantonal level
was active in cantons Nidwalden (until 1996), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (until 1997), and Obwalden
(until 1998). We include observations from these cantons and do not differentiate between cantonal
ballot propositions before and after the abolition of the “Landsgemeinde” in these cantons.
16During our sample period there were 295 federal propositions on 102 polling days. We ex-
clude seven propositions because there were no VOX surveys conducted for those. Three other
propositions are excluded because the variable for the canton of residence of the respondents is
missing.
17Data access via http://www.swissvotes.ch.
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formation is taken from the electronic database on direct democracy maintained by
Department c2d of the Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau (Serdu¨lt, 2017).18
The third data set we use is the Swiss Household Panel (SHP).19 Data are col-
lected throughout the year by phone and provided by FORS for the years 1999 to
2015. The data set contains the following variables with response scales ranging
from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest): interest in politics (1999–2015), satisfaction with
democracy (1999–2012) and perceived personal influence in politics (1999–2012).
We merge the household panel data with information on a weighted average of the
number of propositions over the last 12 months and the upcoming month. The latter
measures of a federal and cantonal exposure index capture the cumulative experi-
ence or exposure to direct democracy. We use linear weights such that, for example,
four propositions that were on the ballot 11 months ago (relative to the interview
date) enter the index with a weight of 30/360 and three propositions that were on
the ballot 2 months ago enter with a weight of 300/360. If two propositions are
to be decided within 2 weeks after the interview date, then these two propositions
enter the index with a weight of 15/30. Figure A.18 shows two violin plots for the
distributions of the respective index values.
4 Empirical Strategy
The Federal Council determines the number of votes to be decided on a single polling
day, whereby it presumably aims at reducing the joint complexity and importance
of votes. Very important votes are usually put on the ballot alone. For instance,
the votes about joining the European Economic Area or the United Nations were
held as single votes. Even considering two or more votes, strategic reasons might
influence the number of votes on the ballot. This is consistent with the decrease in
the perceived importance of the propositions the more of them there are on the ballot
(see Figure A.4). The analysis for the number of federal propositions on the ballot
and voting behavior thus remains correlational. Given the political debate about
overstrained citizens that primarily relies on presumed relations between the number
of federal propositions and citizen engagement, the descriptive analysis might still
productively contribute to the discussion. However, we also attempt to mitigate
potential endogeneity issues with two strategies.
First, we exploit exogenous variation in the number of propositions on the ballot due
to concurrent cantonal propositions. Cantonal propositions are perceived as impor-
18Data access is possible via http://www.c2d.ch.
19A description of the SHP is provided at http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/
swiss-household-panel/
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tant and feature prominently in national and local media. Making these additional
decisions adds to the burden of voters. The number of cantonal propositions is not
correlated with the number of concurrent federal propositions (see Figure A.5). This
indicates that there is no strategic scheduling of the number of cantonal propositions
with respect to federal propositions. That there is no strategic scheduling is plausible
since initiatives and referendums have to be put on the ballot within a certain time
period. The time restriction leaves little scope for cantonal governments to consider
federal propositions when setting the cantonal agenda. Given the institutional con-
ditions, it is thus not surprising that the number of cantonal propositions and the
number of federal propositions are not correlated. Hence, the number of cantonal
propositions provides plausibly exogenous variation in the number of propositions
on the ballot and the corresponding burden voters face.
Second, we control for two determinants of the number of federal propositions on
the ballot: complexity and perceived importance of the propositions. Our postvote
survey data show that perceived importance and the number of propositions are
negatively correlated (see Figure A.4). Similarly, the more difficult the decision in
a specific proposition is perceived to be, the fewer propositions there are on the
ballot (see Figure A.6). To reduce any endogeneity bias, we condition on perceived
importance and perceived complexity in the specifications with postvote survey data.
The extensive data sets allow us to explore the relation between the number of propo-
sitions and several indicators for the decision making of citizens with the following
econometric model:








jβ + ρ pvct + εjpct, (1)
where j indexes individuals, p indexes propositions, c indexes cantons, and t indexes
polling days. Yjpct is our outcome of interest. Two sets of fixed effects are typically
included: canton-specific effects ηc and year-specific effects δyear. Particularly rele-
vant are α and γ. We denote α a vector of coefficients for dummies comprising the
number of federal propositions, fedt. This vector contains dummies for the values
1, 3, and “4 or more” propositions. The dummy for two propositions is used as
the reference category. Similarly for the cantonal level, γ is a vector of coefficients
for dummies comprising the number of concurrent cantonal propositions, and cantct
is the vector containing dummies for the number of propositions from 1 to “5 or
more” propositions, with zero cantonal propositions being the reference category.
Proposal-specific covariates are included in z′p. They consist of dummies indicating
the legal type of the proposal. Variable x′j comprises individual-specific covariates,
which include perceived complexity and importance as well as sociodemographic
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variables. Finally, pvct is a dummy variable that is 1 if there was postal voting
available (from Luechinger, Rosinger and Stutzer, 2007), and εjp is an idiosyncratic
error term.
We use dummies for the number of propositions since it allows a flexible charac-
terization of the impact of the number of propositions on the dependent variables.
The specification we use for the analysis of the administrative data is analogous
to the one above for individual-level data with the exception that no individual-
specific covariates are included. All estimates are retrieved from linear least squares
estimations.20 We cluster the standard errors on polling days to take into account
correlation in voter behavior within a ballot.
5 Results
5.1 Knowledge and Voting Behavior
5.1.1 Knowledge
We assess the relationship between the number of propositions on the ballot and
knowledge of citizens by estimating variants of equation (1). Knowledge offers a
close approximation of voters’ uncertainty in the model of Matsusaka (1995). In
Figure 5 we present the size of the coefficients for the partial correlation between
the number of propositions and voters’ knowledge about the content of current fed-
eral propositions (see also Table 1). Moreover, we show the results with respect
to knowledge about the specific title of federal propositions in the Appendix (see
Figure A.7 and Table A.3). In all figures, we depict the estimates of regressing
the dependent variable on dummies for the number of federal and cantonal propo-
sitions, while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, complexity,
importance, legal type, and socioeconomic variables, if available (equivalent to the
specification in column III of Table 1).
Figure 5 indicates that knowledge is lowest if there is a very high number of federal
as well as cantonal propositions on the ballot. The ability to reproduce the actual
title of a proposition is affected even more (see Figure A.7 in the Appendix). In
what follows, we concentrate on the ability to reproduce the content rather than
the title of a proposition, since it seems more relevant with respect to making an
informed decision.
20We use a linear model since we take into account granular fixed effects that would be difficult
to estimate with nonlinear models.
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the propensity in percentage points to know the
content of a specific federal proposition. Estimates are based on postvote survey data. The reference categories
are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference
level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal
propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved from a regression of knowledge on dummy
variables for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific
effects, year-specific effects, perceived complexity, perceived importance, type of proposition and socioeconomic
variables based on 163,012 observations (see also column III of Table 1).
For federal propositions, the maximal differential between one proposition and four
or more propositions is roughly 10 percentage points. This is sizable when compared
to the 86% baseline probability of recalling the content of a proposal. Note, how-
ever, that this difference is mainly driven by the first category including one federal
proposition. As argued before, the assignment of propositions to polling days is
endogenous, and very important and complex issues are often exclusively put to a
vote. Table 1, column II shows that the effect prevails even when controlling for
perceived importance and complexity of the proposition, an indicator for postal vot-
ing, socioeconomic variables, canton-specific effects, and year-specific effects. Yet,
taking into account complexity and importance as control variables may only partly
attenuate the bias due to endogenous scheduling.
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Table 1: Number of propositions and knowledge: Taking into account the
complexity and importance of the propositions
Dependent variable: Reproducing proposition content [0/100]
Sample: Including nonparticipants
I II III IV
Number of federal propositions
1 7.2461*** 5.8843*** 5.9169***
(2.2997) (2.0830) (2.0896)
3 –0.1562 –0.1206 –0.1644
(1.6253) (1.5324) (1.5228)
4 or more –2.8493* –2.1583 –2.0326
(1.4947) (1.3719) (1.3644)









5 or more –2.2461** –1.7128**
(0.9335) (0.7225)
Low complexity 22.2974*** 22.2748*** 20.0216***
(1.1748) (1.1756) (1.0912)
High complexity 12.9574*** 12.9634*** 12.1454***
(0.8882) (0.8872) (0.8332)
High impact 5.0486*** 5.0600*** 4.0724***
(0.4714) (0.4700) (0.3802)
Referendum –2.7475** –1.8640** –1.8095**
(1.0666) (0.8609) (0.8598)
Mandatory referendum –10.3577*** –8.0176*** –8.0107***
(2.0447) (1.6865) (1.6805)
Counter proposal –9.9267*** –8.4477*** –8.4532***
(2.8779) (2.3863) (2.3717)
Postal voting –3.0636*** –2.9100*** –2.8255*** –2.6920***
(0.7188) (0.6208) (0.6029) (0.6176)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes yes yes
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes yes yes no
Proposition-specific effect no no no yes
R2 0.059 0.091 0.092 0.140
Observations 169,186 163,012 163,012 163,012
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average knowledge of proposition content by all respon-
dents amounts to 76.3. Reference category for the number of federal propositions is 2. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels:
*.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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For the plausibly independently scheduled cantonal votes, the estimates are smaller:
For more than five cantonal votes, the precisely measured negative effect is -2.2
percentage points (se = 0.93) on the propensity to reproduce the content of a federal
proposition correctly. The pattern of slightly declining knowledge for more than two
propositions is remarkably stable to the inclusion of differing sets of control variables
and also when excluding individuals who did not turn out (for the corresponding
results excluding nonparticipants, see Figure A.8, and Tables A.4 and A.5).21 Note
also that the effect size of the federal propositions is not affected by taking into
account the number of cantonal propositions, which underscores that this number
is plausibly exogenous. The effects of the number of cantonal propositions are more
precisely estimated. In column IV of Table 1 we also control for proposition-specific
effects of the federal votes, leading to no change in the estimates.
If we split the sample according to income higher or lower than 7,000 Swiss francs,
older and younger than 50 years, and graduates from a tertiary institution, we
find that older people have slightly fewer problems reproducing proposition content
if there are many concurrent cantonal propositions, while the correlations for the
other groups do not differ substantially (for details, see Appendix A).
5.1.2 Turnout
Turnout is often taken as the main indicator for civic engagement. The results
here rely mostly on administrative data (rather than on self-reported turnout). The
dependent variable is cantonal-level turnout in percentage points for each federal
proposition. We regress the turnout on indicator variables for the number of federal
and concurrent cantonal propositions and control for canton-specific fixed effects,
year-specific fixed effects, and the type of proposition. Table A.6 in the Appendix
contains detailed regression outputs showing the results from the postvote survey
data set and the administrative data set. In addition, Figure A.9 in the Appendix
depicts the results from the postvote survey data.
Figure 6 shows the main estimation results for the administrative data. If anything,
turnout does not decrease but slightly increases as the number of concurrent cantonal
propositions rises. If there are five or more cantonal propositions, turnout is higher
by a precisely estimated 1.9 (se = 0.65) percentage points, while the average turnout
is 43.7 percentage points.22 This finding might be due to a mobilization effect when
21The similarity of effect sizes across samples suggests that it is not selection to the ballot box
that drives our results.
22When using the postvote survey data, we do not find statistically significant effects other than
for 5 or more cantonal propositions. However, except for 3 or 4 concurrent cantonal propositions,
all point estimates for the cantonal propositions are positive. The number of federal propositions
shows a pattern that is similar to that for observations based on the administrative data.
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more citizens are affected with a higher number of propositions on the ballot.23
Independent of the exact interpretation, the finding for turnout does not indicate
that citizens are overstrained.
5.1.3 Blank Voting
Instead of not turning out as the number of propositions on the ballot increases,
voters could just leave all or some of the ballot cards empty if they feel uninformed
or uncertain. For any observed blank voting, there are two potential interpretations,
though. On the one hand, it might reflect the expression of discontent due to
overburdening. On the other hand, the likelihood of having propositions on the
ballot about which some voters care while others do not increases with the number
of propositions on the ballot.
Figure 6: The number of propositions and turnout in federal propositions (in
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on turnout in percentage points. Estimates are based on
administrative data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The
confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval
width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved
from a regression of turnout on dummy variables for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the
ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, and type of proposition based on 7,080
observations (see also column III of Table A.6).
23Alternatively, the pattern might also be due to a comparative reduction in voting costs for
a specific proposition. Schmid (2016) carefully examines the latter argument. In detail, he in-
vestigates how changes in the calculus of voting affects turnout in national votes, by exploiting
exogenous variation in concurrent cantonal elections. He finds that concurrent cantonal elections
lead to higher turnout in votes on federal propositions.
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the propensity in percentage points to cast a blank
vote. Estimates are based on administrative data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero
cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of
the confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition.
The dots are retrieved from a regression of the share of blank votes on dummy variables for the number of
federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects,
and type of proposition based on 7,080 observations (see also column III of Table A.7).
To assess the impact of the number of propositions on the ballot on the propensity
to cast a blank vote we analyze administrative as well as postvote survey data.24
Figure 7 depicts the results for the administrative data (for a complete regression
output, see Table A.7). We find that with four or more federal propositions on the
ballot, the propensity to cast a blank vote is 1 percentage point (se = 0.17) higher
than with two federal proposition on the ballot. The average propensity to cast
a blank vote is roughly 2.6%. The situation of concurrent cantonal propositions
on the ballot minimally increases the propensity to cast a blank vote. The voters
cast a decision for the propositions they care and know about while they leave the
ballot sheet for other proposals blank.25 This suggests that a higher number of
federal propositions mobilizes voters who would otherwise not have participated.
The number of cantonal propositions plays much less of a role.
24In the administrative data set, blank votes are calculated as the difference between received
votes and the sum of “yes” and “no” votes. Therefore, the number of blank votes in the adminis-
trative data set includes void votes. Votes are void if the intention of the voter is not discernible
or if the voters include offending comments on the ballot cards.
25The behavioral regularity that voters with low knowledge selectively abstain is likely to be
beneficial for information aggregation. The correlation between knowledge about the content of a
proposition and casting a blank vote is -0.22 (p < 0.01). If we deduct the blank votes from turnout,
increasing turnout as the number of cantonal proposition increases prevails and the correlation for
the number of federal propositions does not change by much (see Table A.8 in the Appendix).
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5.1.4 Decision Shortcuts
The act of voting can be broken down into two decisions: First, voters decide whether
to participate. Second, they decide how to cast their vote. In this section, we
concentrate on this second aspect and assess how the number of propositions on the
ballot relates to what voters decide.26
Voting for Change — We assess the impact of the number of propositions on
the willingness to support reform (rather than to stick with the status quo), which
is equivalent to voting yes for any proposition. The results are presented in Fig-
ures A.10 and A.11 as well as in Table A.9 in the Appendix. We do not find
consistent effects of citizens opposing change when exposed to many propositions.
This is in contrast to the findings in the recent work of Augenblick and Nicholson
(2016). We only precisely estimate a negative effect of four cantonal propositions
on the propensity to vote yes in federal propositions of -2.3 percentage points.
Reliance on Party and Government Recommendations — Citizens might
apply information shortcuts other than just saying no if they are overstrained. For
instance, they might rely on endorsements, whereby recommendations of pole parties
are especially relevant. Pole parties might have an easier time convincing voters if
there are many propositions on the ballot as they may rely on simpler and more
vigorous arguments than center parties. Another recommendation that citizens
might be more likely to follow is one put out by the government. It is a simple cue
capturing the majority position among the elected politicians.
Figures A.12 and A.13 in the Appendix indicate whether voters rely on arguments
from the right-pole party when there are many propositions (for the full output see
Table A.10). Whether there is just one or many propositions on the federal level,
the endorsements of the largest party on the right, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP),
receive similar support. The difference between one vote and four or more votes is
small with a 0.49-percentage-point difference between them in the administrative
data and not statistically different from 0 at p < 0.1. Moreover, it has to be noted
that the SVP sponsors many initiatives and referendums (Leemann, 2015). These
sponsored propositions are likely to be on the ballot if more than one proposition is
voted on. Thus more informative as a test of the hypothesis that overstrained voters
resort to recommendations of the strongest party on the right is the estimated effect
26Throughout this section, we rely on the result that turnout is not heavily affected by the
number of propositions on the ballot. Note, however, that we estimate reduced form effects and it
might well be that they are partly driven by changes in the composition of the electorate.
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of a large number of concurrent cantonal propositions. They are independent of the
content and the sponsorship of the federal propositions. For them, there also seems
to be no effect on following the pole party on the right.
We also study the relationship for the strongest pole party on the left, that is,
the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP). Figures A.14 and A.15 in the
Appendix show the differences in support of propositions that were endorsed by the
Social Democrats for different numbers of propositions on the ballot (for a detailed
output see Table A.11). As in the case of the pole party on the right, the strongest
party on the left is not better off with many propositions on the ballot. If anything,
their recommendations are followed less when there are many federal propositions
on the ballot. There is thus no evidence that citizens’ voting behavior is consistently
more polarized with a higher number of propositions on the ballot.
Regarding the reliance on the recommendations of the government, Figures A.16
and A.17 in the Appendix summarize the results (for the full output, see Table A.12).
The point estimates for the number of federal as well as concurrent cantonal propo-
sitions do not indicate a systematic relationship. If the content of the federal propo-
sitions is controlled for in column IV in Table A.12 for the administrative data, the
coefficients for the number of cantonal propositions are always below 1 percentage
point (and are rather precisely estimated). These findings are in contrast to earlier
results by Stadelmann and Torgler (2013) and suggest that their findings are driven
by observations toward the beginning of their historical time series.
5.2 Effects of Previous Ballots
So far, we have concentrated on the contemporaneous effect of many propositions
on the ballot. However, there may well be longer term effects. As mentioned above,
citizens may, for instance, get politically more active if there was a higher number
of recent votes due to the formation of specific political capital (or due to habit
formation). Alternatively, citizens might become disenchanted with democracy if
they feel overstrained by a high number of recent votes. To assess the relationship
between the number of recent votes and voters’ decision making, we regress the
outcomes of interest on the total number of federal and cantonal propositions within
the last 12 months.
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Figure 8: The relationships between the number of recent propositions and
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Note: The figures show coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of recent propositions on the respective outcome variables. The reference
categories are eight federal propositions and four cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown for the
reference level of propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated effects of the
adjacent categories. The dots are retrieved from a regression of individual knowledge of proposition content
or individual voting behavior (blank or yes voting) on dummy variables for the number of current and recent
federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects,
type of proposition, and socioeconomic variables (see also Table A.13). The sample contains all votes on the
cantonal and federal level, not just concurrent votes.
We explore the effect of an active direct democracy in the recent past on voter knowl-
edge and voter behavior in terms of yes voting and blank voting. Figure 8 depicts
the main results (see also Table A.13 in the Appendix). Our estimates suggest that
citizens, if anything, become slightly more knowledgeable if there were many direct
21
democratic votes within the last 12 months. With 12 or more propositions within
the last 12 months they are an imprecisely estimated 4 percentage points more likely
to know the exact proposition title than if there were two to four propositions on
ballots in the recent past.
Moreover, it seems that the more propositions there were on recent ballots, the
higher the propensity of people to vote for change rather than resorting to the status
quo. However, the point estimates are again imprecisely estimated. The pattern for
blank votes suggest a slight increase with higher recent activity on the cantonal
level. Overall, we do not find strong evidence for citizens being overstrained by a
high number of recent ballot propositions.
5.3 Attitudes Toward Politics
We study the relationship between an active direct democracy and attitudes toward
politics using reported interest in politics, perceived influence in politics, and satis-
faction with democracy. We relate the exposure to the weighted sum of all federal
and cantonal propositions in the last 12 months and the upcoming 30 days (as of the
interview date) to the reported measures of citizens’ efficacy in simple ordinary least
squares estimations. Table 2 presents the results with the indexes included either
in linear terms or as a second-order polynomial. In the Swiss Household Panel, the
same people are interviewed repeatedly, allowing the inclusion of individual-specific
fixed effects in our specifications. We thus identify the effect of the variation in
exposure to direct democracy over time within individuals.
Political interest seems positively correlated up to an intermediate level with expo-
sure to an active direct democracy. Perceived influence in politics tends to be higher
during times in which citizens experience a high number of federal propositions. If
the federal exposure index takes a maximum value of 10.6 rather than the minimum
value of 0.1, the difference in perceived influence amounts to 0.18. The specification
including the exposure index squared does not indicate an internal optimum but
rather an increasing effect. In contrast to the federal exposure index, the expo-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similarly, the results suggest that satisfaction with democracy tends to be higher
during periods of particularly active direct democratic decision making at the federal
level (with no sign of a decreasing marginal effect) but not at the cantonal level. The
change in an individual’s reported satisfaction with democracy amounts to 0.22 for
the maximal change in the federal exposure index from 0.1 to 10.5. Relative to the
mean level of 6.06, this is a change of 4%. In sum, for the variation in exposure to an
active direct democracy experienced during the first decade of the 21st century, there
is no evidence for a detrimental effect on attitudes toward politics. To the contrary,
an intensive process at the federal level seems positively related to citizens’ perceived
influence in politics and satisfaction with democracy.
6 Concluding Remarks
Recent referendums in Europe and elsewhere have led to discussions about the future
of democratic institutions in general and the role of direct democracy in particular.
Some commentators worry about overstrained citizens while others emphasize that
the direct democratic process is as demanding as it is rewarding. Citizens are in-
vited to engage in politics by deciding about specific issues over and above electing
representatives. From a politicoeconomic perspective, this requires that voters learn
about the issues at stake and form reasoned opinions or at least find information
shortcuts and recommendations they trust. Institutional conditions can help ensure
the quality of the process. If the outcomes of referendums and initiatives are bind-
ing for Parliament, the decisions are taken seriously by the citizens as well. If there
are no participation quorums, there is less of an incentive to sabotage the debate
by calling for citizens not to participate in the direct democratic process. Free and
diverse media allow citizens to learn about the propositions, and the media might
themselves be strengthened by a democratic process that generates a higher demand
for political information. Similarly, a civil society of people organized in formal and
informal networks who discuss societal and political issues supports the functioning
of the process but is itself strengthened by the means of direct democratic partici-
pation possibilities.
In this paper, we concentrate on the condition of there being not too many propo-
sitions citizens are confronted with to decide. This complements arguments of too
few or too irregular referendums, that is, that direct democracy works differently
as a regular process from below than as a rare ad hoc process initiated from above.
While the experience of direct democracy offers educative effects, there might be
limits to how many issues citizens would want to handle, resulting in a decline of
procedural as well as outcome utility. Our empirical assessment offers a framework
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that could be of general interest for the study of overstrained citizens. However, it
is clearly shaped by the institutional context of Swiss direct democracy. In contrast,
for example, to California, in Switzerland there are several polling days a year at
both the federal and cantonal and sometimes also at the municipal level. The same
number of propositions is thus dealt with rather differently, being spread over the
year in Switzerland while concentrated on single election days in many other juris-
dictions. This institutional feature might as such be an important safeguard against
overstraining citizens.
For the observed variation in the number of federal and cantonal propositions on
a single polling day and the exposure to an active direct democracy, we do not
find systematic evidence for overstrained citizens. Using comprehensive data on
vote outcomes and attitudes, we show that only with a relatively high number of
propositions on the ballot do voters have less knowledge about federal propositions.
Otherwise, the set of results suggests that a high number of propositions does not
impede the quality of decision making in direct democracy, and in particular it does
not increase voting for the status quo or the emulation of pole-party endorsements.
To the contrary, a higher number of recent federal propositions is related to higher
perceived political influence and satisfaction with democracy.
In the end, citizens decide about the extent of their own legislative competence
(at least in the Swiss constitutional context) — they have Kompetenz–Kompetenz
regarding the regulation of the direct democratic process. They decide about the
scope of their direct democratic participation rights as well as the requirements for a
proposition to qualify for a place on the ballot. This affects what issues get decided
and how often citizens are asked to go to the polls. So far, the self-regulation of the
system seems to have worked well. We submit to the citizens that currently there is
little reason to worry about an overly intensive direct democratic process. However,
we might reconsider this analysis if there are many more propositions in the future,
for example, because committees are allowed to submit signatures electronically.
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A. Knowledge About Content: Heterogeneity
It may well be that certain groups, for instance, older people, face a comparatively
higher cost of acquiring information about additional propositions. Consequently,
an active direct democracy could be harmful to the ability of specific groups to take
part in the political process productively. We therefore look at whether the small
aggregate effects of the number of propositions on the ballot mask heterogeneous
reactions of groups differentiated by their income, age, and education. Figure A.1
depicts the effects of the number of federal propositions on knowledge. Results
for the subpopulations high income, high age, and high education are presented in
blue, whereas the effects for the comparison group (low income, low age, and low
education) are depicted in black (for the complete regression output see Table A.1).
Panel a shows the the differential effects for high- and low-income groups. High
income corresponds to a monthly household income of more than 7,000 Swiss francs
(approximately U.S. $7,200). Median household income in Switzerland was 8,506
Swiss francs in the year 2004 (Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik , BFS). Although high-income
voters know the content of a specific proposition more often on average, they are
not less or more affected by more propositions being on the ballot. The differen-
tial reaction to the number of propositions on the ballot is small and imprecisely
measured.
In the same vein, panel b depicts age differences in knowledge. People above the
age of 50 years know about as much as those below that age, independent of the
number of federal propositions on the ballot. However, if we examine effect of the
number of cantonal propositions, a more nuanced picture emerges. On the cantonal
level, older people seem to gather information comparatively more easily.
Panel c shows the estimates for high versus low education. High education corre-
sponds to graduates from tertiary institutions, who make up a quarter of the voters
in our data set. Highly educated voters have a 3.5-percentage-point higher propen-
sity to know the content of a proposition on average. However, they do not seem
to have an advantage in terms of gathering specific knowledge on propositions more
easily as the number of propositions on the ballot grows.
In summary, knowledge slightly decreases as the number of propositions grows.
The measured effect sizes are very small compared with the average propensity to
reproduce the propositions’ content and also when compared to the positive effect
on knowledge of just one proposition on the ballot. The overall finding seems not
to indicate heterogeneity across major groups of the citizenry.
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Figure A.1: The number of propositions and knowledge for different socioeco-
nomic groups
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on knowledge. The reference categories are two federal
propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal
propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions
and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved from a regression of individual knowledge on dummy
variables for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot, interacted with a dummy that
indicates above-average income, age, or education. We control for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects,
institutional variables, and socioeconomic variables (see also Table A.1).
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Table A.1: Number of propositions and knowledge: Differential effects for
income, age, and level of education
Dependent variable: Reproducing proposition content [0/100]
Sample: Participants, postvote survey data
High income High age High education
Number of federal propositions
1 3.9325* 6.3783*** 6.9139***
(2.1277) (2.1990) (2.2337)
3 –0.5021 –0.3750 0.5085
(1.9025) (1.5508) (1.6295)








Characteristic-specific interactions with number of federal propositions
1 –1.5353 –0.7886 –2.7177**
(1.0010) (0.6549) (1.2273)
3 –0.6731 0.3590 –1.5399
(0.8219) (0.5541) (0.9386)
4 or more 0.4668 –0.6389 –0.3413
(0.9435) (0.6975) (0.9236)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 –0.0678 0.2910 0.5446
(0.5929) (0.4581) (0.5505)
2 –1.0555 –1.4319** –1.0445
(0.7855) (0.6433) (0.6812)
3 –0.7523 –0.4610 –0.6339
(0.9265) (0.7179) (0.6878)
4 –0.3042 –2.5778*** –1.7807**
(1.0168) (0.9008) (0.8262)
5 or more –1.8602 –3.5977*** –2.2988**
(1.4803) (1.0105) (1.0602)
Characteristic-specific interactions with number of cantonal propositions
1 –0.5355 0.0765 –0.5352
(0.7654) (0.5551) (0.6068)
2 0.3851 0.6098 –0.2908
(0.8942) (0.6461) (0.6422)
3 0.1565 –0.0769 0.4179
(0.8624) (0.7739) (0.9763)
4 –1.6348 1.4653 –0.1109
(1.0991) (1.1216) (0.9368)
5 or more –0.2511 2.7326*** 0.1013
(1.2311) (0.9947) (1.0878)
Institutional variables yes yes yes
Socioeconomic variables yes yes yes
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes yes yes
R2 0.091 0.092 0.090
Observations 101,738 163,271 161,840
Mean of characteristic 0.35 0.45 0.30
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average knowledge on propositions of participants amounts to 79.5.
Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. High income (age or education) indicates that the
respondent’s income (age or education) is above the sample mean. Income (age or education) is not included as
a socioeconomic control variable if high income (high age or high education) is interacted with the number of
federal propositions. The sample for the specification with the income interaction starts in the year 1995. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1,
**.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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B. Figures
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Data source: Database of Swiss Federal Referendums, Swiss Federal Statistical Office .
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Data source: c2d, Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau.
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Figure A.4: Perceived importance of federal propositions by the number of
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Note: The figure shows estimates of the mean perceived importance of federal propositions grouped by the
number of concurrent propositions. The 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered on
the level of polling days. There was one vote weekend with nine federal propositions on the ballot, which was
subsumed under six federal propositions on the ballot.
Data source: VoxIt.
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Regression line (correlation: -0.01)
Note: The figure shows the number of federal and cantonal propositions per vote weekend. Each dot represents
a vote weekend in a specific canton. Gaussian noise was added to increase visibility.
Data sources: Swiss Federal Statistical Office and c2d, Center for Democracy Studies Aarau.
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Figure A.6: Reported difficulties in assessing the consequences of propositions
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of responses concerning the difficulties in assessing the consequences of
a proposition, grouped by the number of concurrent propositions. There was one vote weekend with nine federal
propositions on the ballot, which was subsumed under six federal propositions on the ballot.
Data source: VoxIt.
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the propensity in percentage points to know the
content of a specific proposition. Estimates are based on postvote survey data. The reference categories are
two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of
federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal proposi-
tions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved from a regression of knowledge on dummy variables for
the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-
specific effects, perceived complexity, perceived importance, institutional variables, and socioeconomic variables
based on 168,524 observations (see also column III of Table A.3).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the propensity in percentage points to know the
content of a specific proposition. Estimates are based on postvote survey data. The reference categories are
two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of
federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal proposi-
tions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved from a regression of knowledge on dummy variables for
the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-
specific effects, perceived complexity, perceived importance, institutional variables, and socioeconomic variables
based on 251,317 observations (see also column III of Table A.4).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on turnout in percentage points. Estimates are based on
postvote survey data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The
confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval
width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved
from a regression of turnout on dummy variables for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the
ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, institutional variables, and socioeconomic
variables based on 264,450 observations (see also column I of Table A.6).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of yes votes in percentage points. Estimates
are based on administrative data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal
propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the
confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition.
The dots are retrieved from a regression of the yes vote share on dummy variables for the number of federal
and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, and
institutional variables based on 7,080 observations (see also column III of Table A.9).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of yes votes in percentage points. Estimates
are based on postvote survey data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal
propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the
confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The
dots are retrieved from a regression of the yes vote share on dummy variables for the number of federal and
cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, institutional
variables, and socioeconomic variables based on 158,872 observations (see also column I of Table A.9).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of votes in percentage points that are
in line with the vote recommendation of the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Estimates are based on
administrative data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The
confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval
width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved
from a regression of the share of people voting in line with the voting recommendation of the SVP on dummy
variables for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific
effects, year-specific effects, and institutional variables based on 7,056 observations (see also column III of
Table A.10).
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Figure A.13: The number of propositions and support of right-wing recom-
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of votes in percentage points that are
in line with the vote recommendation of the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Estimates are based on
postvote survey data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The
confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval
width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved
from a regression of a dummy for an individual vote in line with the SVP’s recommendation on dummy variables
for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects,
year-specific effects, institutional variables, and socioeconomic variables based on 158,872 observations (see also
column I of Table A.10).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of votes in percentage points that are
in line with the vote recommendation of the left-wing Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP). Estimates
are based on administrative data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal
propositions. The confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the
confidence interval width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The
dots are retrieved from a regression of the share of people voting in line with the voting recommendation of
the SP on dummy variables for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling
for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, and institutional variables based on 6,648 observations (see also
column III of Table A.11).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of votes in percentage points that are in line
with the vote recommendation of the left-wing Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP). Estimates are based
on postvote survey data. The reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions.
The confidence interval shown for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval
width for the estimated effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved
from a regression of a dummy for an individual vote in line with the SP recommendation on dummy variables
for the number of federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects,
year-specific effects, institutional variables, and socioeconomic variables based on 158,872 observations (see also
column I of Table A.11).
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of votes in percentage points that are in
line with the vote recommendation of the federal government. Estimates are based on administrative data. The
reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown
for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated
effects of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved from a regression of
the share of voters following the governments voting recommendation on dummy variables for the number of
federal and cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects,
and institutional variables based on 7,008 observations (see also column III of Table A.12).
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Figure A.17: The number of propositions and support of government recom-
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Note: The figure shows coefficient estimates, 95% confidence intervals (thin lines), and 90% confidence intervals
(thick lines) for the effect of the number of propositions on the share of votes in percentage points that are in line
with the vote recommendation of the federal government. Estimates are based on postvote survey data. The
reference categories are two federal propositions and zero cantonal propositions. The confidence interval shown
for the reference level of federal propositions is the mean of the confidence interval width for the estimated effects
of three federal propositions and one federal proposition. The dots are retrieved from a regression of a dummy for
an individual vote in line with government recommendation on dummy variables for the number of federal and
cantonal propositions on the ballot while controlling for canton-specific effects, year-specific effects, institutional
variables, and socioeconomic variables based on 158,872 observations (see also column I of Table A.12).
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Note: The figure shows the distributions of exposure values assigned to Swiss Household Panel respondents,
used in Table 2.
46
C. Tables
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for the variables from postvote survey and
administrative data sets
Individual data Aggregated data
June 14, 1981 - June 14, 2015
285 federal propositions on 97 voting days
June 14, 1981 - June 14, 2015














Reproduce proposition title 66.10 47.34 0 / 100 264,437
Reproduce proposition content 79.49 40.37 0 / 100 251,317
Participation 64.01 47.99 0 / 100 264,450 44.60 10.41 13.8 - 87.2 7,056
Participation excluding blank voting 61.49 48.66 0 / 100 264,466 43.35 10.10 13.5 - 86.5 7,056
Blank 4.20 20.06 0 / 100 158,872 2.60 2.03 0.08 - 26.02 7,056
Yes 47.29 49.93 0 / 100 158,872 48.10 19.35 3.9 - 95.3 7,056
Explanatory variables
Number of federal propositions 2.94 1.46 1 – 9
97 federal
polling days
2.89 1.47 1 - 9
102 federal
polling days
Number of cantonal propositions 1.10 1.53 0 – 17
2,050 cantonal
polling days
1.07 1.51 0 - 17
2,448 cantonal
polling days
Number of federal propositions
within last 12 months
8.11 3.54 0 – 19
97 federal
polling days
7.93 3.66 0 - 19
102 federal
polling days
Number of cantonal propositions
within last 12 months
4.38 3.88 0 – 27
2,050 cantonal
polling days




Initiative 0.428 0.496 0 / 1 285 propositions 0.418 0.494 0 / 1 295 propositions
Referendum 0.288 0.453 0 / 1 285 propositions 0.289 0.454 0 / 1 295 propositions
Mandatory referendum 0.214 0.411 0 / 1 285 propositions 0.221 0.416 0 / 1 295 propositions
Counterproposal 0.070 0.256 0 / 1 285 propositions 0.071 0.258 0 / 1 295 propositions
Postal voting 0.712 0.453 0 / 1 285 propositions 0.632 0.482 0 / 1 295 propositions
Individual controls for importance
and complexity of propositions
High impact 0.435 0.496 0 / 1 264,998
Low complexity 0.540 0.498 0 / 1 291,613
High complexity 0.290 0.454 0 / 1 291,613
Socioeconomic variables
Age 48.0 17.6 18 – 98 292,933
Male 0.491 0.500 0 / 1 293,608
Advanced education 0.300 0.458 0 / 1 291,039
High income 0.347 0.476 0 / 1 185,587
Note: Advanced education is for graduates from a tertiary institution. High income is for people
with a household income of more than 7,000 Swiss francs per month.
Data sources: The dependent variables in the individual data set, the controls for complexity and
importance, and the socioeconomic variables are from VoxIt (Kriesi, Brunner and Lore´tan, 2017);
the number of federal propositions and the dependent variables in the aggregated data set are from
the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFS); information about the legal form of the propositions
and government recommendations are from Swissvotes; the numbers of cantonal propositions are
from c2d, Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau; information about the availability of postal voting
is from Luechinger, Rosinger and Stutzer (2007).
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Table A.3: Number of propositions and knowledge: Taking into account the
complexity and importance of the propositions
Dependent variable: Reproducing proposition title [0/100]
Sample: Participants
I II III IV
Number of federal propositions
1 14.9165*** 13.7215*** 13.7840***
(3.3550) (3.2591) (3.1215)
3 –4.0059** –4.0777** –4.0012**
(1.9981) (1.8823) (1.8027)
4 or more –11.4993*** –11.1097*** –10.8181***
(2.0338) (1.9971) (1.9074)









5 or more –6.6379*** –6.7312***
(1.4117) (1.1314)
Low complexity 13.4298*** 13.3506*** 11.3035***
(0.9867) (0.9880) (0.8993)
High complexity 8.5789*** 8.5699*** 6.7691***
(0.8289) (0.8280) (0.7847)
High impact 5.5874*** 5.6121*** 3.1343***
(0.6682) (0.6640) (0.4861)
Referendum –1.0184 –0.3603 –0.0999
(2.0259) (1.9081) (1.9173)
Mandatory referendum –7.4064*** –5.6475*** –5.5398***
(2.2573) (2.1167) (2.0963)
Counterproposal –7.6017** –6.7452** –6.6515**
(3.2789) (3.1624) (3.1101)
Postal voting –0.6165 –0.3359 –0.1942 –0.0893
(1.1200) (1.1515) (1.1089) (1.1159)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes yes yes
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes yes yes no
Proposition-specific effects no no no yes
R2 0.123 0.131 0.133 0.193
Observations 175,487 168,524 168,524 168,524
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average knowledge of proposition title by participants
amounts to 74.02. Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels: *.05 < p <
.1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
48
Table A.4: Number of propositions and knowledge: Taking into account the
complexity and importance of the propositions
Dependent variable: Reproducing proposition content [0/100]
Sample: Including nonparticipants
I II III IV
Number of federal propositions
1 7.2244* 5.8161** 5.8661**
(3.8654) (2.8144) (2.8375)
3 0.7794 0.2118 0.1836
(2.3539) (1.9164) (1.9047)
4 or more –1.6798 –1.3862 –1.2178
(2.3289) (1.8017) (1.7908)









5 or more –2.2258** –1.9781**
(1.0811) (0.7796)
Low complexity 34.2721*** 34.2521*** 32.1268***
(0.9882) (0.9866) (0.9732)
High complexity 20.7821*** 20.7946*** 20.5709***
(0.7606) (0.7624) (0.7428)
High impact 8.4074*** 8.4181*** 7.3185***
(0.5055) (0.5050) (0.4345)
Referendum –3.1008* –1.6575 –1.6016
(1.5690) (1.1259) (1.1293)
Mandatory referendum –14.1229*** –10.1844*** –10.1604***
(2.5545) (1.8989) (1.8885)
Counterproposal –12.4742*** –9.8295*** –9.8422***
(2.9960) (2.4143) (2.3984)
Postal voting –3.4000*** –3.6244*** –3.5415*** –3.2665***
(1.0008) (0.8205) (0.7971) (0.8075)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes yes yes
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes yes yes no
Proposition-specific effects no no no yes
R2 0.102 0.186 0.186 0.231
Observations 273,868 251,317 251,317 251,317
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average knowledge of proposition content by all re-
spondents amounts to 79.49. Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels:
*.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.5: Number of propositions and knowledge: Taking into account the
complexity and importance of the propositions
Dependent variable: Reproducing proposition title [0/100]
Sample: Including nonparticipants
I II III IV
Number of federal propositions
1 17.0564*** 15.4546*** 15.5440***
(3.9087) (3.4570) (3.3612)
3 –2.0743 –2.7983 –2.5891
(2.4551) (2.1060) (2.0872)
4 or more –9.4770*** –9.2958*** –8.9761***
(2.5753) (2.3219) (2.2979)









5 or more –5.8456*** –5.9361***
(1.2930) (1.0305)
Low complexity 28.7930*** 28.7658*** 27.4133***
(1.5446) (1.5493) (1.4883)
High complexity 19.9080*** 19.9374*** 19.0245***
(1.2091) (1.2163) (1.2027)
High impact 8.7787*** 8.7992*** 6.7049***
(0.6123) (0.6077) (0.4711)
Referendum –2.6042 –1.0691 –0.8716
(2.0637) (1.8218) (1.8337)
Mandatory referendum –9.4036*** –5.8570*** –5.7635***
(2.3897) (2.0722) (2.0539)
Counterproposal –10.1837*** –8.0012*** –7.8708***
(2.8983) (2.8199) (2.7843)
Postal voting –0.2116 0.1395 0.2959 0.3557
(0.9817) (1.0369) (1.0038) (1.0180)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes yes yes
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes yes yes no
Proposition-specific effects no no no yes
R2 0.133 0.181 0.182 0.234
Observations 290,894 264,437 264,437 264,437
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average knowledge of proposition title by all respon-
dents amounts to 66.10. Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels:
*.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.6: Number of propositions and voting participation
Dependent variable: Voting participation [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more –0.5218 0.6242
(1.3953) (2.0651)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 0.9394 0.8670* 1.0059*** 0.9237***
(0.5677) (0.5043) (0.3816) (0.3448)
2 0.5115 0.0256 1.2579*** 0.9171***
(0.7189) (0.7085) (0.4219) (0.3233)
3 –0.1212 0.4922 1.2820*** 1.2425***
(0.9265) (0.8687) (0.4677) (0.3766)
4 –0.3670 –0.9122 1.3170* 1.3175**
(1.1567) (1.0760) (0.7690) (0.6536)
5 or more 2.2233** 2.0240** 1.8600*** 1.7075***
(1.0108) (0.9881) (0.6451) (0.5431)
Low complexity 45.5090*** 45.6698***
(0.8196) (0.7727)
High complexity 33.6388*** 33.1813***
(0.7868) (0.7631)








Postal voting 4.7761*** 4.7136*** 5.7535*** 5.7843***
(0.9597) (0.9469) (0.4982) (0.4915)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.238 0.246 0.541 0.790
Observations 264,450 264,450 7,080 7,080
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average turnout amounts to 64.01 in the individual data
set and 44.60 in the aggregated data set. Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2.
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance
levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
51
Table A.7: Number of propositions and blank voting
Dependent variable: Ratio of blank votes [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more 1.8599*** 1.0116***
(0.4351) (0.1684)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 0.0191 0.0524 0.2076*** 0.2103***
(0.2149) (0.1866) (0.0622) (0.0497)
2 –0.2876 –0.2940 0.1616** 0.2522***
(0.3182) (0.3095) (0.0632) (0.0490)
3 0.1673 0.2411 0.1328* 0.2005***
(0.3945) (0.3449) (0.0773) (0.0715)
4 –0.0755 –0.1726 0.3334*** 0.3594***
(0.4135) (0.3453) (0.1232) (0.1085)
5 or more 0.0530 0.1000 0.2391** 0.3311***
(0.4124) (0.3619) (0.1098) (0.0840)
Low complexity –17.5288*** –16.8010***
(1.1148) (1.0610)
High complexity –12.5274*** –12.0622***
(0.9925) (0.9476)








Postal voting –0.1819 –0.1818 0.0204 0.0039
(0.3558) (0.3545) (0.0589) (0.0590)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.074 0.090 0.485 0.813
Observations 158,872 158,872 7,080 7,080
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average ratio of blank votes amounts to 4.20 in the
individual data set and 2.60 in the aggregated data set. Reference category for number of federal
propositions is 2. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling
days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.8: Number of propositions and turnout without blank voting
Dependent variable: Turnout excluding blank votes [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more –1.5123 –0.0430
(1.3018) (2.0676)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 0.8892 0.7922 0.8486** 0.7900**
(0.5523) (0.4990) (0.3640) (0.3250)
2 0.6607 0.1963 1.1409*** 0.7787**
(0.7158) (0.7095) (0.4138) (0.3050)
3 –0.2282 0.3235 1.2169*** 1.1418***
(0.8022) (0.7985) (0.4582) (0.3631)
4 –0.2042 –0.7399 1.0341 1.0646*
(1.0095) (0.9521) (0.7537) (0.6128)
5 or more 2.0704** 1.8466* 1.6996*** 1.5202***
(0.9543) (0.9458) (0.6279) (0.5172)
Low complexity 46.8180*** 46.7262***
(0.7385) (0.7051)
High complexity 32.4891*** 31.9565***
(0.7524) (0.7347)








Postal voting 4.6146*** 4.5674*** 5.5704*** 5.6115***
(0.9424) (0.9328) (0.4792) (0.4709)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.252 0.258 0.526 0.799
Observations 264,466 264,466 7,080 7,080
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average turnout excluding blank votes amounts to 61.49
in the individual data set and 43.35 in the aggregated data set. Reference category for number of
federal propositions is 2. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of
polling days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.9: Number of propositions and yes voting
Dependent variable: Ratio of yes votes [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more 4.8902* 3.1374
(2.8118) (2.3012)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 1.4262 0.8968 0.2454 0.4682
(0.9848) (0.5805) (0.5328) (0.3008)
2 2.2636** 0.5493 0.1029 0.1252
(0.8708) (0.4856) (0.5299) (0.3694)
3 0.1644 0.2963 –0.6391 0.0704
(1.1882) (0.6033) (0.5824) (0.3888)
4 –1.4621 0.2205 –2.7005*** –1.0372
(1.4418) (1.0181) (0.9184) (0.6733)
5 or more 1.2006 1.1157 –0.4426 0.6725
(1.7051) (0.9761) (1.0301) (0.6776)
Low complexity 9.0238*** 9.5261***
(1.1783) (1.0774)
High complexity 2.5982** 3.9327***
(1.0309) (0.9378)








Postal voting –0.6518 –0.5320 0.4119 0.2735
(0.8102) (0.7880) (0.4760) (0.5072)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.099 0.172 0.451 0.847
Observations 158,872 158,872 7,080 7,080
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average ratio of yes votes amounts to 47.29 in the
individual data set and 48.10 in the aggregated data set. Reference category for number of federal
propositions is 2. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling
days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.10: Number of propositions and support of right-wing party recom-
mendations
Dependent variable: Percentage of votes that followed recommendations of
Swiss People’s Party [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more 7.6463** 6.1440**
(3.2162) (2.8606)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 –2.2833** 0.3507 –0.5092 0.4041
(1.0490) (0.5824) (0.4781) (0.3264)
2 –0.2491 1.0472** –0.2380 0.2434
(1.2246) (0.5092) (0.6038) (0.3521)
3 –0.9809 0.7772 –0.1335 0.5655
(1.0921) (0.6620) (0.6139) (0.4686)
4 –0.7045 1.0953 0.0297 0.4238
(1.6165) (0.9423) (0.9909) (0.6453)
5 or more –2.3631 1.3066 –0.9070 0.2708
(1.5426) (0.8791) (0.7974) (0.5440)
Low complexity 11.6787*** 11.1985***
(1.0817) (1.2025)
High complexity 6.5667*** 7.0637***
(0.8308) (0.9602)








Postal voting –0.4561 –0.3136 –0.3078 –0.5014
(0.8629) (0.8210) (0.5508) (0.5041)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.054 0.160 0.233 0.807
Observations 158,872 158,872 7,056 7,056
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average ratio of votes according to recommendation of
the Swiss People’s Party amounts to 52.52 in the individual data set and 58.57 in the aggregated
data set. Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. Standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 <
p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.11: Number of propositions and support of left-wing party recom-
mendations
Dependent variable: Percentage of votes that followed recommendations of
Social Democratic Party of Switzerland [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more –10.1095*** –4.9894
(3.7200) (3.3214)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 –1.3879 –0.5392 –0.6142 –0.4532*
(0.9238) (0.5570) (0.5301) (0.2573)
2 0.0152 0.1920 –0.7669 –0.4196
(1.2063) (0.5058) (0.6733) (0.3664)
3 –1.2331 –0.6466 –0.7349 –0.8855**
(1.1779) (0.6100) (0.6325) (0.3572)
4 1.4637 0.5410 –1.9859** –0.3077
(1.6431) (0.8747) (0.9170) (0.5507)
5 or more 1.3206 –0.0364 –1.0674 0.0076
(1.8974) (0.9818) (1.0414) (0.4986)
Low complexity 10.8328*** 10.7167***
(1.1850) (0.9901)
High complexity 5.4374*** 6.1343***
(0.9365) (0.8911)








Postal voting 0.9001 1.1763 0.7873 1.0024*
(1.0011) (0.8908) (0.6164) (0.5656)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.064 0.208 0.290 0.868
Observations 158,872 158,872 6,648 6,648
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average ratio of votes according to recommendation of
the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland amounts to 50.87 in the individual data set and 50.80
in the aggregated data set. Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels:
*.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A.12: Number of propositions and support of government recommen-
dations
Dependent variable: Percentage of votes that followed government recommen-
dations [0/100] / [0-100]
Sample: Participants / full voting population, aggregated on cantonal level
Postvote survey data Administrative data
I II III IV





4 or more –2.5801 2.9498
(3.3586) (2.5091)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 –1.1811 1.1196** –0.3860 0.2780
(0.9336) (0.5389) (0.6098) (0.3560)
2 –0.2425 0.8203 –1.0183* –0.3624
(1.0252) (0.5234) (0.5870) (0.4227)
3 –2.2125* 0.0602 –1.0563 –0.5107
(1.1780) (0.6794) (0.6493) (0.4785)
4 –2.5401* 0.6624 –1.2601 0.2362
(1.5202) (0.8751) (1.0966) (0.7115)
5 or more –2.5883* 0.8331 –1.5508 0.1673
(1.5463) (0.9528) (0.9924) (0.7987)
Low complexity 14.0840*** 14.0059***
(1.1097) (1.0226)
High complexity 5.6864*** 7.1304***
(0.9947) (0.9097)








Postal voting –0.0814 –0.3739 0.5871 0.3017
(0.8335) (0.7782) (0.5286) (0.5216)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes no no
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes no yes no
Proposition-specific effects no yes no yes
R2 0.041 0.112 0.243 0.754
Observations 158,872 158,872 7,008 7,008
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average ratio of votes according to government rec-
ommendation amounts to 59.77 in the individual data set and 60.96 in the aggregated data set.
Reference category for number of federal propositions is 2. Standard errors in parentheses are ad-
justed for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05,
***p < .01.
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Table A.13: Number of propositions and habit formation
Dependent variables: Knowledge of proposition content, blank voting, and yes
voting [0/100]
Sample: Participants. Individual postvote survey data
Knowledge Blank Yes
Number of federal propositions
1 5.2300** –2.6437*** 2.0439
(2.1922) (0.6073) (5.0791)
3 –0.2519 0.1999 –4.4508*
(1.5110) (0.3679) (2.4209)
4 or more –1.5301 1.9058*** 5.8761**
(1.2605) (0.4502) (2.9467)
Number of cantonal propositions
1 0.1167 0.0507 1.5160
(0.4058) (0.2161) (0.9313)
2 –1.3748** –0.1914 2.1645***
(0.5625) (0.2999) (0.8198)
3 –0.5862 0.2233 –0.0169
(0.6338) (0.3609) (1.1166)
4 –2.1108*** –0.0292 –1.8872
(0.6611) (0.3755) (1.3995)
5 or more –2.7758*** 0.1419 0.8089
(0.8605) (0.3844) (1.3316)
Number of federal propositions within last 12 months
2–4 –2.9612* 0.7998 –3.2022
(1.6388) (0.9941) (5.4272)
5–7 –1.5968 0.4729 –0.6591
(1.8924) (0.9468) (5.3538)
9–11 –1.1493 1.2211 3.8227
(2.1791) (1.1021) (5.0040)
12 or more 1.3194 1.1507 4.4287
(2.5220) (1.1025) (6.4031)
Number of cantonal propositions within last 12 months
0 –0.4448 0.7353** 0.2580
(0.8181) (0.3503) (1.3223)
1 –0.3302 0.2350 1.3261
(0.7747) (0.3717) (1.2336)
2 0.0690 0.5139* –1.6096
(0.7937) (0.3022) (1.1685)
3 –0.2247 0.9632 0.0379
(0.6831) (0.6058) (1.2184)
5–7 –1.5762** 0.8455*** 0.0904
(0.7707) (0.3207) (1.1939)
8–11 –0.9028 0.6746** –0.0807
(0.7179) (0.2945) (1.2136)
12 or more –0.1963 0.7946* 1.8516
(0.8541) (0.4081) (1.5396)
Low complexity 22.2177*** –17.5160*** 9.0260***
(1.1797) (1.1140) (1.1761)
High complexity 12.9165*** –12.5147*** 2.6071**
(0.8895) (0.9905) (1.0221)
High impact 5.0407*** –4.9902*** 11.0355***
(0.4683) (0.4246) (1.0795)
Referendum –2.1409** 1.4145*** 15.8364***
(0.8410) (0.4343) (2.6735)
Mandatory referendum –8.3735*** 1.7326*** 30.1502***
(1.7823) (0.5219) (3.1130)
Counterproposal –8.6211*** 1.2438 24.6456***
(2.3862) (0.7565) (5.0632)
Postal voting –2.6957*** –0.1681 –0.7730
(0.6309) (0.3458) (0.8142)
Socioeconomic variables yes yes yes
Canton-specific effects yes yes yes
Year-specific effects yes yes yes
R2 0.093 0.074 0.100
Observations 163,012 158,872 158,872
Note: Ordinary least squares estimations. Average knowledge of proposition content by participants amounts to 86.92, average ratio
of blank votes amounts to 4.20, and average ratio of yes votes amounts to 47.29. Reference category for number of federal propositions
is 2. Reference category for number of federal propositions within last 12 months is 8 (median of distribution). Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of polling days. Significance levels: *.05 < p < .1, **.01 < p < .05, ***p < .01.
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